We present an intuitive explanation of the Cho and Kreps '(1987) Intuitive Criterion, and the Banks and Sobel's (1987) Divinity Criterion (also referred as D 1 -Criterion). We provide multiple examples in which students can understand, step-by-step, the two main phases that all these re…nement criteria involve. Furthermore, we present economic settings showing why the Cho and Kreps'(1987) Intuitive Criterion does not restrict the set of equilibria in signaling games, and where the Banks and Sobel's (1987) Divinity Criterion re.nes the set of admissible separating equilibria in signaling games.
Introduction
Many economic contexts can be understood as sequential-move games involving elements of incomplete information among …rms, consumers, etc., since in few cases every agent knows all the relevant information about other agents in the economy. This situation has been extensively analyzed in economics using signaling games, whereby one agent, privately informed about some relevant characteristic, chooses an action that might reveal information to other agents. Signaling games are then an excellent tool to explain a wide array of economic situations from the role of education in the labor market (Spence, 1973) to the practice of limit pricing by …rms (Battacharya, 1979 , and Kose and Williams, 1985) , and from dividend policy (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982) to the type of warranties …rms o¤er to their customers (Gal-Or, 1989 ). However, one of the main drawbacks of this class of games is that the set of strategy pro…les that can be supported as Perfect Bayesian equilibria is usually relatively large, limiting the predictive power of the model. In addition, a second disadvantage is that some of these equilibria predict insensible behavior from the players.
Re…nement criteria as the Cho and Kreps'(1987) "Intuitive Criterion" and the Banks and Sobel's (1987) "Universal Divinity" Criterion (also referred as the D 1 -Criterion) help overcome these potential disadvantages. In fact, multiple results in the industrial organization literature rely on the application of some of these re…nement criteria.
Few game theory or industrial organization textbooks, however, o¤er an intuitive and applied approach to re…nement criteria in signaling games. One of the objectives of this paper is to provide a gentle introduction to the Cho and Kreps'(1987) Intuitive Criterion and the Banks and Sobel's (1987) Divinity Criterion. We use multiple step-by-step examples to help understand the two main stages involved in both of these re…nement criteria. In particular, the analysis focuses on the Spence's labor signaling model, assuming two types of workers, and discusses how the application of the Cho and Kreps' (1987) Intuitive Criterion is su¢ cient to eliminate all but one equilibria.
We then show that under more than two types of workers, in contrast, the former criterion does not eliminate any equilibria, and we must rely on a more powerful re…nement criterion, such as the Divinity Criterion, in order to restrict the set of equilibria in the signaling game.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we describe the Cho and Kreps' (1987) Intuitive Criterion, providing two examples: the signaling game that a monetary authority plays with a labor union, and the labor market signaling game. Afterwards, section four presents the Banks and Sobel's (1987) Divinity Criterion, with an example of its application. Section …ve answers the question "When do we need to apply the Divinity Criterion?" by providing an example of the Spence's labor market signaling game with three types of workers (in which the Intuitive Criterion does not restrict the set of equilibria).
Signaling games
Consider a sequential-move game with the following time structure:
1. Nature reveals to player i some piece of private information (e.g., cost structure, the state of market demand, etc.). We denote this information as player i's type i where i 2 . In the previous examples, the set of types might be = fHigh costs, Low costsg for production costs or = fHigh demand, Low demandg for market demand. 1 2. Then, player i, who privately observes i , chooses an action which is observed by all players moving afterwards. Player i's action may reveal information about his type to player j.
For this reason, this action is normally referred to as message m. The player sending such message (player i) is referred to as the "sender," while the player receiving such message is the "receiver."
3. Player j observes message m, but does not know player i's type. He knows the prior probability distribution with which nature selects a given type i from , ( i ) 2 [0; 1]. Player j, observing player i's message, updates his beliefs about player i's type. Let ( i jm) denote player j's beliefs about player i's type being exactly = i after observing a particular message m.
4. Given his beliefs about player i's type ( i jm), player j selects an optimal action, a, as a best response to player i's message, m.
In a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this signaling game, given equilibrium message m chosen by the sender, equilibrium action a chosen by the receiver, and the sender's type being i , player i's equilibrium payo¤ is u i (m ; a ; i ), where for convenience u i ( ) u i (m ; a ; i ). And similarly, player j's utility when player i's type is i is u j (m ; a ; i ). Finally, let a 2 A ( ; m) denote the action that the receiver optimally selects, after observing message m from the sender, and given that the set of possible types which can potentially send message m is 2 .
The Intuitive Criterion First
Step. Let us start analyzing the Intuitive Criterion. The …rst step focuses on those types of senders who can obtain a higher utility level by deviating (i.e., when they send o¤-the-equilibrium messages) than by keeping their equilibrium message m unaltered. Speci…cally, let us denote this set of agents as the subset of types for which a given o¤-the-equilibrium message is not equilibrium dominated (i.e., for which the equilibrium payo¤ does not dominate the highest payo¤ they could obtain by sending such an o¤-the-equilibrium message). Formally, for any o¤-the-equilibrium message m, we construct a subset of types (m) for which m cannot be equilibrium dominated.
That is,
Intuitively, expression (1) states that, from all types in , we restrict our attention to those types of agents for which sending the o¤-the-equilibrium message could give them a utility level higher than that in equilibrium, u i ( ). Note the emphasis on "could" since max
represents the highest payo¤ that a -type can achieve by sending the o¤-the-equilibrium message 3
m. In short, we can interpret (m) as the subset of senders who could achieve a higher utility level by sending the o¤-the-equilibrium message m rather than their equilibrium message m .
Second
Step. The second step of the Intuitive Criterion 4 considers the subset of types for which the o¤-the-equilibrium message m is not equilibrium dominated, (m), and checks if the equilibrium strategy pro…le (m ,a ), with associated equilibrium payo¤ for the sender u i ( ), satis…es
Let us interpret the former inequality: once beliefs are restricted to (m), the originally pro- That is, there is at least one type of sender who prefers to deviate to a message m which provides him with a higher utility level than his equilibrium message m , regardless of the response of the receiver.
Formally, an equilibrium strategy pro…le (m ,a ) violates the Intuitive Criterion if there is a type of agent and an action he can take m such that condition (2) Let us next analyze how to apply the Intuitive Criterion in a game with two types of agents and only two responses for the receiver. Afterwards, we extend this analysis to more general games.
Example 1 -Discrete messages
Let us consider the following sequential-move game with incomplete information, where a monetary authority decides whether to announce that the expectation of in ‡ation for the upcoming year is High or Low, and a labor union which reacts to this announcement, demanding high or low wage raises. For simplicity, we assume that the monetary authority is Strong with probability 0.6 or Weak with probability 0.4, where this prior probability distribution is common knowledge among all players. 5 For convenience, we denote by the labor union's beliefs that the monetary authority is strong after observing a high in ‡ation announcement, and let denote these beliefs after observing 
First
Step. The …rst step of the Intuitive Criterion eliminates those o¤-the-equilibrium messages that are equilibrium dominated. In this case, a message of Low in ‡ation is an o¤-the-equilibrium message. 6 In order to check if Low is equilibrium dominated, we need to …nd what types of monetary authorities prefer to keep sending High (in equilibrium) rather than deviating by sending Low (o¤-the-equilibrium message). In particular
The …rst inequality is indeed satis…ed since 200<300 when the monetary authority is Strong.
Speci…cally, the strong monetary authority obtains a payo¤ of 200 in equilibrium (by sending a high in ‡ation announcement, which is responded with Low). But it could obtain a higher payo¤ by deviating towards a Low in ‡ation announcement, 300, which arises when the labor union responds with Low wage demands. In contrast, when the monetary authority is Weak, its equilibrium payo¤ in the pooling PBE, 150, is higher than the maximum that it could obtain by deviating, 50 (which also occurs when the labor union responds to a Low in ‡ation announcement choosing Low wage demands). Hence, the Strong monetary authority could indeed deviate to Low announcements of in ‡ation but the Weak type could not. As a consequence, the subset of types for which the 6 Note that in the separating PBE (Low,High) all messages are sent in equilibrium by some type of monetary authority. Hence, there are no o¤-the-equilibrium messages. When no o¤-the-equilibrium messages can be identi…ed in a given PBE, such PBE survives the Intuitive and the D1-Criterion. This is a useful result when checking which PBE survives these re…nement criteria in signaling games.
o¤-the-equilibrium message (Low in ‡ation) is not equilibrium dominated is (Low) = fStrongg, since such a message can only come from the Strong monetary authority. Hence, the labor union's beliefs when observing such a message are = 1 (at the upper right-hand corner of the …gure).
Second
Step. The second step uses the above restriction on beliefs ( = 1) to study if there is a type of monetary authority and a message it could send such that condition (2) is satis…ed (i.e., obtaining a higher utility than in equilibrium, regardless of the labor union's response). First, when the labor union observes the o¤-the-equilibrium message of Low in ‡ation, it responds with Low wage demands, since it concentrates all its beliefs in the node at the upper right-hand side corner of the game tree, i.e., = 1. By sequential rationality, and given this labor union response, the Strong monetary authority prefers to make an announcement of Low in ‡ation levels. Indeed, this announcement is responded by the labor union with Low, providing a payo¤ of 300 to the monetary authority, which is higher than its equilibrium payo¤ of 200. Note that the second step of the Intuitive Criterion involves
conditional on the belief that the Low in ‡ation announcement can only come from the Strong monetary authority, i.e., a Labor 2 A (Strong; Low). Then, the Strong monetary authority prefers to deviate from the pooling PBE of (High, High). Therefore, the pooling PBE of (High, High)
violates the Intuitive Criterion given that there exist a type of sender (Strong monetary authority) and a message (Low) which gives that sender a higher utility level than in equilibrium, regardless of the response of the follower (labor union).
Example 2 -Continuous messages
Let us now analyze the traditional Spence's (1973) signaling game with two types of workers, one with a high productivity level, and the other with a low productivity, = f H ; L g, and a continuum of wage o¤ers w 2 [0; 1]. The worker acts as the sender in this game because he acquires a particular education level that is observed by the …rm which is potentially interested in hiring him. Education is, nonetheless, not enhancing the worker's productivity, and hence it serves only as a signal about the worker's productivity level. In particular, the …rm's pro…t function is (w; ) = w, and the worker's utility function is u i (e; w; K ) = w c(e; K ), where c(e; K ) represents the worker's cost of acquiring education level e. Consider that acquiring no education is costless, c(0; K ) = 0 for both types of workers. Additionally, assume that the marginal cost of acquiring an additional year of education, c e (e; K ), is decreasing in the worker's productivity, i.e., c e (e; H ) c e (e; L ), and therefore worker's indi¤erence curves satisfy the single- years of education, while the H -type of worker acquires e H = e 2 years of education. In this case, education "fully reveals" the worker's type, since the …rm can perfectly infer the worker's productivity level by observing the education he acquires. As a consequence, the …rm o¤ers a low wage o¤er to workers who acquire no education, w(e L ) = L , and a high wage to workers with e 2 years of education, 7 w(e H ) = H . In …gure 2, IC L and IC H denote the indi¤erence curves for the low and high-productivity workers, respectively, in this equilibrium. Since higher wages increase worker's utility and education is costly to acquire, indi¤erence curves to the northwest (higher wages and less education) are associated to higher utility levels. First step. Consider now that the …rm observes an o¤-the-equilibrium message e 2 (e 1 ; e 2 ), as indicated in …gure 2. In order to study what type of worker might have sent such a message, let us apply the previous analysis of equilibrium dominance. In particular, for the L -type of worker, we have that
That is, his equilibrium payo¤ u L ( L ) is higher than the maximal utility he could obtain if the …rm o¤ered him the highest possible salary. In other words, his equilibrium payo¤ from sending
, is higher than the highest payo¤ he could obtain by sending the o¤-the-equilibrium message e, H c(e; L ) (when the …rm believes that the worker is a Htype and pays him a salary of w(e) = H ). Therefore, the above inequality implies that for any o¤-the-equilibrium message e 2 (e 1 ; e 2 ),
Intuitively, the cost from acquiring e years of education for the low-productivity worker, c(e; L ), exceeds the wage increase, H L , he can experience if the …rm believes that, because of acquiring 7 Note that this separating PBE can be supported if o¤-the-equilibrium education levels e 6 = e L ; e H are responded with wage o¤ers such as w(e) = L.
education level e, he must be a high productivity worker, paying him w(e) = H . Graphically, the L -worker's indi¤erence curve when he acquires the equilibrium education level e L = 0 is represented by IC L , and the indi¤erence curve from acquiring the (o¤-the-equilibrium) education level e and receiving a salary of w(e) = H would cross point A. Clearly, the indi¤erence curve associated to education level e L implies a higher utility level than that associated with e, even when the salary the worker receives is w(e) = H . This process can then be repeated for any o¤-the-equilibrium message e 2 (e 1 ; e 2 ), concluding that the L -type of worker does not send such a message, because it is equilibrium dominated.
Let us now apply the same analysis of equilibrium dominance to the H -worker. This type of worker can send the o¤-the-equilibrium message e since:
Intuitively, he receives the same salary as in equilibrium (w(e) = H ) but incurs fewer costs because of acquiring a lower education level, i.e., c(e 2 ; H ) > c(e; H ) since e 2 > e. Hence, the equilibrium payo¤ of this worker is lower than the maximal payo¤ he could obtain if the …rm manager o¤ers him a salary of w(e) = H after observing education level e. Graphically, indi¤erence curves through point A (if he receives the high salary) are associated to higher utility levels than that in equilibrium, as represented by IC H . Therefore, o¤-the-equilibrium message e is not equilibrium dominated for the H -worker, but it is for the L -worker. We can now state which is the subset of types that the receiver (…rm) considers after observing the o¤-the-equilibrium message e. In particular, the …rm concentrates its beliefs on the H -type of worker, since he is the only type whose utility can increase by deviating from his equilibrium message. Formally, we state that the subset of types for which message e is not equilibrium dominated is given by (e) = f H g.
Second step. The subset of types who could have sent message e is (e) = f H g. Then, the …rm o¤ers a wage of w (e) = H given that it assigns full probability to the worker being a high-productivity worker. Note that the minimal utility level that the worker can achieve from sending the o¤-the-equilibrium message e is min Therefore, the separating PBE where workers acquire education levels fe L ( L ) ; e H ( H )g = f0; e 2 g violates the Intuition Criterion because there exists a type of worker, H , and an o¤-the-equilibrium message e 2 (e 1 ; e 2 ), for which the above inequality is satis…ed. Intuitively, the H -worker can signal his type (productivity level) to the …rm by acquiring less education than in the separating equilibrium where he acquires e H = e 2 .
It can be veri…ed that all separating equilibria can be eliminated following the above procedure, except for the equilibrium in which the low-type acquires zero education and the high-type acquires education level e 1 . The surviving separating equilibria is usually referred to as the e¢ cient equilibrium outcome (or Riley outcome, after Riley, 1979) , since it is the equilibrium in which workers spend the least amount of resources in signaling to the …rm their di¤erent productivity levels. Speci…cally, the L -type acquires an education level of e L = 0 and the H -type acquires the minimal education level that allows him to separate himself from the L -type, e H = e 1 . We illustrate this equilibrium in the following …gure. 
The Divinity Criterion
As described in the previous section, the Intuitive Criterion restricts the receiver's beliefs to those type of senders for which deviating towards a given o¤-the-equilibrium message could improve his equilibrium payo¤. If more than one type of sender could bene…t from such deviation, however, the Intuitive Criterion assumes that the receiver's beliefs assign the same weight to all potential deviators (as if they were all equally likely to deviate towards the o¤-the-equilibrium message).
The D 1 -Criterion, instead, considers that, among all potential deviators, the receiver restricts his beliefs to only those types of senders who most likely send the o¤-the-equilibrium message.
In particular, this restriction on beliefs is analyzed by focusing on the sender for whom most of the responder's actions provide a payo¤ above his equilibrium payo¤. Formally, 8 for any o¤-the-equilibrium message m, let us de…ne
as the set of mixed best responses 9 (MBR) of the receiver for which the -type of sender is strictly better-o¤ deviating towards message m than sending his equilibrium message m . Note that b j m = 1 in the previous de…nition represents that the receiver believes that message m only comes from types in the subset b 2 . Let us also de…ne
as the set of MBR of the receiver that make the -type indi¤ erent between deviating towards message m and sending his equilibrium message m . Let us next describe the …rst step of the Divinity Criterion.
First
Step. A -type can be deleted if there is another 0 -type such that, when the o¤-theequilibrium message m is observed
That is, for a given message m, the set of receiver's actions which make the 0 -type of sender better o¤ (relative to equilibrium), D 0 ; b ; m , is larger than those actions making the -type of sender strictly better o¤, D ; b ; m , or indi¤erent, D ; b ; m . Intuitively, after receiving message m there are more best responses of the receiver that improve the 0 -type's equilibrium payo¤ than there are for the -type. As a consequence, the 0 -type is the sender who is most likely to deviate from his equilibrium message m to the o¤-the-equilibrium message m. We continue this comparison for all types of senders, deleting those for which there is another type of sender who is more likely to deviate towards m. Finally, the set of types that cannot be deleted after using this procedure is denoted by (m).
Second
Step. As discussed in the previous section, the second step of both the Intuitive and the D 1 -Criterion, analyzes the subset of types for which the o¤-the-equilibrium message m is not equilibrium dominated, (m), and check if the equilibrium strategy pro…le (m ,a ), with associated equilibrium payo¤ for the sender u i ( ), satis…es
Criterion to the Spence's labor market signaling game. 9 The set of mixed best responses (MBR) of the receiver to a given message m from the sender includes both the actions that the receiver chooses using pure strategies, and those involving mixed strategies. First step. First, after sending an o¤-the-equilibrium message e 0 , the set of wage o¤ers that improve the equilibrium payo¤ of the low-productivity worker, D L ; b ; e 0 , is smaller than that for the high-productivity worker, D H ; b ; e 0 , i.e., D L ; b ; e 0 D H ; b ; e 0 . These two sets are represented in …gure 4 below. Intuitively, after sending message e 0 , there are more wage o¤ers that improve the equilibrium payo¤ of the high-productivity worker than that of the lowproductivity worker; see sets D H ; b ; e 0 and D L ; b ; e 0 , respectively, in …gure 4. Hence, the H -type is more likely to send message e 0 . As a consequence, the …rm, after receiving message e 0 , restricts its beliefs to
On the other hand, after observing the o¤-the-equilibrium message e 00 , the …rm knows that sending such a message would never be payo¤ improving for the low-productivity worker, i.e., D L ; b ; e 00 = ;. However, sending e 00 might be pro…table for the high-productivity worker.
Indeed, as the …gure indicates, the high-productivity worker can receive some wage o¤ers that would raise his utility level beyond his equilibrium payo¤. Hence, when observing the o¤-theequilibrium message e 00 , D L ; b ; e 00 D H ; b ; e 00 , as …gure 4 indicates. Therefore, message e 00 is most likely to come from a H -worker, (e 00 ) = f H g. Repeating this process for any o¤-theequilibrium message, we can prove that, after observing any education level e o¤-the-equilibrium path, …rm's beliefs are restricted to (e) = f H g : Figure 4 . Applying the D 1 -criterion to the labor market game.
Second step. After restricting the subset of types who could have sent any o¤-the-equilibrium message e to (e) = f H g, the …rm o¤ers a wage of w (e) = H given that it assigns full probability to the worker being a high-productivity type. Now, let us apply the same methodology as in the second step of the Intuitive Criterion. First note that, the minimal utility level that the worker can achieve from sending the o¤-the-equilibrium message e is min Criterion, one can show that all separating equilibria in this game can be eliminated using the D 1 -Criterion, except for the e¢ cient (Riley) outcome, where the low-productivity worker acquires an education level of e L = 0 and the high-productivity worker only acquires education e H = e 1 .
5 When do we need to apply the D 1 -Criterion?
In the previous section, we described the Intuitive and D 1 -Criterion, and examined that, when there are only n = 2 types of senders, the equilibria that survive these two equilibrium re…nement coincide. However, as we show in this section, this might not be the case when there are n > 2 types of senders (for instance, more than two types of workers in the labor market signaling game).
First, we describe how the application of the Intuitive Criterion to signaling games with more than two senders might not help us restrict the set of equilibria, and then we show that the D 1 -Criterion reduces the set of equilibria in this class of games. First step. First, we need to construct the subset of types (e) for which the o¤-theequilibrium message, e 2 (b e; e H ), is never equilibrium dominated (see message e 2 (b e; e H ) in …gure 5). That is, 
)
Let us start checking this condition for the L-type. In particular, note that
. That is, the above condition implies c(e; L ) > H L , indicating that the cost of acquiring e years of education for the L-type of worker exceeds his potential salary gain, H L . Graphically, his equilibrium utility level,
, is represented by the indi¤erence curve IC L , and max
u L (e; w; L ) would correspond to the downward shift of the indi¤erence curve IC L that passes through point B (when the worker is paid the high-productivity wage w(e) = H ). So, L does not send a message e 2 (b e; e H ). In contrast, M -workers could send such a message e 2 (b e; e H ) because workers, since they both have incentives to deviate from their equilibrium messages. Therefore, when …rms observe e 2 (b e; e H ) they will concentrate their beliefs on those types of workers for which these education levels are not equilibrium dominated:
(e) = f M ; H g for all e 2 (b e; e H ) Second step. Once we have determined (e) = f M ; H g for all e 2 (b e; e H ), we need to …nd a type that can be tempted to send an education level in e 2 (b e; e H ) anticipating that …rms' best response to this education level will be a wage o¤er somewhere in between w (e) = M and w (e) = H . First, for the M -worker, if he thinks pessimistically, he can consider the case in which his deviation towards message e 2 (b e; e H ) is interpreted by …rms as coming from a M -worker.
Hence, the …rm will o¤er w (e) = M and M -workers' indi¤erence curve will pass through point A, being below the indi¤erence curve corresponding to his equilibrium payo¤. Therefore, min w2W ( (e);e) u M (e; w; ) < u M ( ) and the M-type's equilibrium payo¤ exceeds the lowest payo¤ he can obtain from deviating towards e. Similarly for the H -worker, if he thinks pessimistically, he can consider the same situation described above. That is, …rms believe that any message e 2 (b e; e H ) must come from a M -worker, and as a consequence they o¤er w (e) = M : Therefore, H -workers' indi¤erence curve through point A is also below his indi¤erence curve at the equilibrium payo¤. So, min w2W ( (e);e) u H (e; w; ) < u H ( ) Therefore, there does not exist any type of worker in the set (e) = f M ; H g who would deviate towards the o¤-the-equilibrium message e 2 (b e; e H ). Hence, the separating PBE speci…ed in …gure 5 does not violate the Intuitive Criterion. Thus, the application of the Intuitive Criterion does not necessarily eliminate separating PBE with n > 2 types of senders.
Example 4b -Continuous messages with n= 3 types of workers. D 1 -Criterion. We now show that the D 1 -Criterion restricts the set of equilibria, even if the set of senders is strictly larger than n = 2. First step. We reduce the …rms' beliefs by considering who is the type of worker who most probably sent message e 0 . We next de…ne the set of wage o¤ers for which a worker of type i = fL; M; Hg can improve his equilibrium utility level, u i ( i ), by acquiring education level e 0 rather than his equilibrium education of e i (see …gure 6). Intuitively, the set of wage o¤ers for which the M -type of worker improves his equilibrium utility is larger than those for which the L-type of worker improves his (see …gure 6), making the former more likely to deviate towards e 0 than the latter. So, applying the D 1 -Criterion, we can eliminate Hence, …rms beliefs when observing an education level of e 0 can be restricted to only the M -type of worker, (e 0 ) = f M g :
Second step. Given (e 0 ) = f M g, …rms o¤er a wage w (e 0 ) = M when observing an education level of e 0 . Therefore, for the M -worker we have that Hence, we have found a type of worker, M , for whom deviating towards e 0 improves his equilibrium payo¤, u M ( M ). Therefore, the separating PBE described in …gure 6 above violates the D 1 -Criterion. Repeating this process for all o¤-the-equilibrium messages, we can delete all separating PBEs, except for the e¢ cient (Riley) equilibrium outcome described in the following …gure. Figure 7 . E¢ cient separating equilibrium with 3 types of workers.
